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William Bradford Research Paper

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I am very pleased and know that I have someone that knows what they are doing and follows instructions!!!! Great work!!! Thank you, Thank you!! Thank you. Directly causing is an intransitive relation. Causation when used without modifier is transitive: events are causally related if there is a chain of direct causes, however long, that connects them. They can then reiterate that there is another way of ensuring that this condition holds, namely, the set of relations, diagrammed in Fig. The foregoing way of responding to the self-stultification argument is further explained and defended in Robinson b, ; see also a.

An alternative response can be found in Chalmers ; see also Nagasawa, It allows for persons to be directly acquainted with experiences, and it is this direct acquaintance, rather than any causal relation, that justifies our beliefs about experiences. In supplying non-causal relations to support the claim to knowledge of experiences, this view disconnects the knowledge question from the question of how things stand causally, and thus avoids the self-stultification argument.

A third response to self-stultification begins with the observation that terms for sensory qualities words for colors, flavors, pitches and timbres, etc. It is part of epiphenomenalist theory that the first brain events mentioned in b include causes of sensations of characteristic kinds, and that, after learning, those same brain events causally determine the production of predicates in sensation reports. The combination of these relations ensures that, so long as conditions in the brain are normal, a report of a sensation is guaranteed to correctly identify the kind of sensation that is normally caused in the speaker by objects that are standardly described by the predicate in the report.

This guarantee underwrites a claim to knowledge of what kinds of sensation we are having. Conditions may, of course, sometimes be abnormal. But that cannot be a defeater for epiphenomenalist knowledge of our sensations, because all views must allow for the possibility of cognitive breakdowns such as unnoticed slips of the tongue or linguistic difficulties brought on by disease. In a paper, Michael Pauen has given a particularly persuasive argument that offers a new and deeper twist to the problem of what epiphenomenalists can consistently claim to know about qualia. Since epiphenomenalists deny the identity of qualia and physical properties, such laws are not only contingent, but independent of physical laws.

Thus, epiphenomenalists must concede the possibility of worlds in which the physical laws are as they are here, but there are no laws connecting physical events to qualitative events. If such worlds are possible, we might actually be in such a world, and so the epiphenomenalist can be asked to provide evidence that we are not in such a world. But the epiphenomenalist denial of efficacy for qualia precludes the possibility of providing any such evidence. Even conceding that we know at each moment what qualia we are having, we cannot exclude the possibility that our memories seem to tell us of qualitative events that never occurred or that were of different kinds than we seem to remember ; yet we would have to rely on such memories in order to have evidence of causal laws holding between physical and qualitative events.

Another argument that turns on memory is given by Swinburne, Inability to decisively answer this latter challenge is not generally taken to impugn our knowledge concerning tables and chairs, nor are physicists expected to lay it to rest before proceeding with their science. Staudacher points out that if we are allowed to raise skeptical challenges of the kind Pauen raises, it will be possible to construct analogous, unanswerable skeptical challenges for interactionism. And, although Staudacher does not provide an analogous case for physicalism, it seems that parallel difficulties are constructable. For example, according to physicalism, it would seem to be a conceptual possibility that qualia are identical, not with neural properties, but with a combination of neural properties and phases of the Moon, while memory traces depend only on neural properties.

But it is not clear that physicalists need to admit the necessity of providing evidence against such a view, in order to responsibly affirm their view. Megill has raised a problem for epiphenomenalism based on the assumption that properties must be individuated by their causal relations. Since epiphenomenalists deny efficacy to phenomenal qualities, the only causal relations to which they could appeal to individuate them would be causes of events with those qualities. However, different causes may produce the same effect. Thus, appeal to difference of causes alone is an insufficient basis for individuation of phenomenal qualities.

Epiphenomenalists can be expected to deny the necessity of causal relations for individuation. They may consistently hold, for example, that the unique hues are qualities that simply differ and have no metaphysical need for a principle of individuation. An epistemological problem, however, may appear to remain: How can epiphenomenalists know that they experience different phenomenal qualities?

This, however, is the self-stultification problem in a different guise, and epiphenomenalists can refer to the responses already considered. One might have thought that if the mental and the physical are identical, there could be no room for epiphenomenalistic questions to arise. Behavior is caused by muscular events, and these are caused by neural events. Mental events will be identical with some of these neural events; so whatever effects these neural events have will be effects of mental events, and mental events will make a causal contribution to, i.

Questions about epiphenomenalism, however, arise the moment any distinction is made between the mental properties and the physical properties of an event. Section 3. The third of these ways is still the subject of lively debate, and some of the issues will be explained in sections 3. It should be noted that most recent writers take a somewhat dogmatic position against epiphenomenalism. They presume that epiphenomenalism is to be avoided, and they go to great lengths to try to show that they have avoided incurring that anathema, despite maintaining the sufficiency of physical causation in conjunction with some kind of distinction between the mental and the physical.

Davidson accepted the view that causation involves laws and, in view of ii , held that the laws into which mental events entered related physical properties or, mental events under their physical descriptions. Many philosophers regarded this view as tantamount to epiphenomenalism, i. It is thought to be highly implausible that belief in a particular proposition, or desire for a particular state of affairs, is identical with the same state of a brain or a part of a brain in different people, or even in the same person at different times.

Since the physical properties of different neural events are different, transitivity of identity prohibits claiming identity of mental properties with any of the physical properties whose instantiation realizes those mental properties. In a body of work stretching over many years, Jaegwon Kim , , e. Since behavior depends on muscle contractions that depend on neural innervation, it seems that physical events and structures, and the physical laws that apply to them, are quite enough to bring about our behavior.

There is nothing left for mental properties to do. There are, of course, some cases in which there is more than one sufficient cause of an event. But instances of mental properties are not distinct from instances of physical properties that are their realizers in the way that stabbings are distinct from each other, and systematic overdetermination of our behavior is generally regarded as implausible. Many writers have held that Kim-style exclusion arguments depend on an understanding of causation for which there are preferable alternatives.

See, e. This kind of response is sometimes put forward as providing a more correct account of causation. Epiphenomenalists may concede that there is some such sense, but still think their view is vindicated if all the productive causation is provided by the physical activities of our brains. Epiphenomenalists may also emphasize that examples in exclusion arguments are usually beliefs, desires or intentions. These mental properties are closely associated with behavioral dispositions, and can easily be understood in functional terms for which multiple realizability is immediately plausible. As Kim has explicitly recognized, however, , p.

We are unable to understand why it should be that a series of neural activations occurring in various degrees of intensity and temporal relations should always be accompanied by pain, or itch, or, indeed, by any phenomenal quality whatever. Inability to see any such necessity is, of course, not a proof that such a necessity does not obtain. Nonetheless, absent insight into the necessity of the connection between neural properties and qualitative properties, we are arguably in an explanatory position similar to traditional epiphenomenalism.

That is, we will have a sufficient explanation of behavioral reactions to stimuli that invokes exclusively neural properties. In addition, we may hold the view that these neural properties are necessarily connected to qualitative properties; but, lacking explanation of this necessity, this connection will contribute no understanding of how qualitative properties could make a difference to behavior. Because this difficulty has not been removed in the case of qualia, the success or failure of the previously discussed Traditional Arguments remains relevant to contemporary thinking about epiphenomenalism. Shapiro and E. Sober have developed an alternative line of argument that they hold to apply just as well to functional properties and properties that resist functional analysis.

The distinction between common causation and realization plays a key role. Common causation, they note, can lead to an empirically based denial that one co-effect causes another. It is impossible, however, to suppress a realized condition while leaving its realizer constant, so there is no sense to the demand that beliefs should have causal powers that are additional to the causal powers of their neural state realizers. Nor is it possible to suppress a phenomenal quality while holding constant a state with its allegedly identical neural property. Baltimore has responded by arguing that there are reasons other than that illustrated by the mice tails example for denying efficacy to mental events. Whether this strong critique is accepted or not, it is evident that removing a reason for objecting to efficacy of mental events in virtue of their mental properties does not by itself provide a positive reason for asserting such efficacy.

Such a reason may, however, be found in the subset view proposed by Shoemaker Suppose further that this belief is involved in an inference, and that its possessor arrives at a new belief, i. The subset view is the subject of lively debate; see, e. One objection is that the subset view assumes rather than shows that M has any causal powers at all, and that this is the key question at issue Kim, Reasons have been offered for doubting this assumption, i. Segal argues that being a belief and being a desire are dispositional properties, and that dispositional properties are not efficacious.

Tammalleo supports an exclusion argument, and invokes mechanisms independently established by cognitive psychology to explain why we have the mistaken intuition that mental states are causes. Frank Jackson has given an epiphenomenalistic argument that has spawned lively responses from many quarters. Having been confined to a black and white room, however, Mary has never had a color experience. Jackson asks whether Mary will learn anything when she is released from her confinement and thus comes for the first time to have color experiences. When combined with the traditional arguments Pro given above, it becomes a potent source of support for epiphenomenalism.

David Lewis undertakes a thorough response to the knowledge argument. That the taste of Vegemite has this physical effect is a piece of physical information. Now, either of these possibilities is compatible with all the physical information we have; i. Everything relevant to physics can be expressed by the lawlike relations in which quarks stand to fundamental physical objects and properties. Either of these possibilities is compatible with all the physics we have, i. The generalization of this point is that the intrinsic properties of the fundamental objects of physics must be epiphenomenal. Bertrand Russell , p. Denis Robinson , however, regards intrinsic similarity of fundamental physical entities as different from similarity of phenomenal properties.

If phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of fundamental physical objects, and the latter stand in lawlike relations, then lawlike relations will hold between phenomenal properties and some physical occurrences. This conclusion appears to give a causal role to phenomenal properties and thus to suggest a way out of epiphenomenalism. But if intrinsicality carries epiphenomenality, as D. Moreover, since there is no phenomenal quality that we are always experiencing, no instantiation of a quality by a fundamental physical particle can, by itself, be one of our sensations.

It is thus not clear that Russellian monism gives any more causal role to our sensations than does epiphenomenalism see Robinson, for elaboration. There are some empirical results that engage epiphenomenalism in several ways. These empirical results do not cut as deeply as the foregoing arguments, for they do not claim to show that consciousness is completely inefficacious. In particular, they do not show, and are not aimed at showing, that episodes of consciousness do not causally contribute to reports of such episodes. They suggest instead that the reported consciousness is not causally related to our nonlinguistic behavior in ways that we ordinarily suppose.

An early and very well known argument derives from the work of B. Libet , Libet asked participants in his experiments to make an unplanned movement when they felt the urge to do so, and to report using a specially designed clock-like instrument the time when they felt the urge to move. The key finding was that after allowing for corrections due to neural transmission times the RP occurred about ms earlier than the time that participants reported having the urge to move. Libet himself allowed for the possibility of a veto after the urge that would block the movement.

However, many have drawn an implication that the conscious urge to make a movement comes too late to causally contribute to a movement that has already been initiated by brain processes that were detected by the RP measurement. A corollary of this implication is that, to the extent we have an intuition that our urge to move caused the movement, we are subject to a causal illusion. The possibility of causal illusion, in turn, weakens the intuitive argument against epiphenomenalism explained in section 2. More recently, work led by J-D. Haynes ; see also Soon, et al. This work seems unsettling for the following reason. If we believe we were weighing options on a matter that was still open at, say, one second before our conscious decision, but our action was already predictable from neural events before that, then we would be under some illusion about the extent to which our conscious decision has an effect on our behavior.

Work by Wegner and Wheatley , Wegner , and Linser and Goschke , describes participants who have judged themselves to have partial control of movements over which they in fact lacked control. But if we can demonstrably have illusions about being in control, our sense of being in control of our actions cannot be taken as evidence that our conscious intentions actually have effects in our nonlinguistic behavior. Such illusions further imply that we sometimes lack knowledge of the actual course of causation of our actions. In well-regarded studies, Nisbett and Wilson a, b showed that people sometimes confabulate, that is, they give reasons for evaluative judgments that do not reflect the actual causes of making those judgments.

This work again carries two implications: that people are sometimes mistaken in accepting efficacy of what they believe to be their reasons for a judgment, and that they are sometimes mistaken about the real reasons for their behavior. The implications drawn from these experiments have been criticized on several grounds. The force of the work led by Haynes is mitigated by the fact that predictions of behavior from several seconds before its occurrence, while statistically significant, are far from perfect. Many other points have been made see Nahamias, ; Mele, ; Shepherd, ; Baumeister et al. Two basic criticisms are offered by many writers. First, many of the experimental conditions involve meaningless setups ouija-like boards, for example or meaningless decisions e.

These oddities and simplifications may be thought to render ineffective psychological mechanisms that would be operative in more realistic cases and that would forestall illusions about the relation between our consciously entertained reasons and our behavior. Second, the fact that there are some cases in which unconscious influences have a noticeable effect on our behavior does not show that we are never, or even not usually, acting in a manner that would be rational, given our particular longstanding beliefs and preferences.

Huxley and his contemporaries seem to have been impressed by preparations in which frogs had had various portions of their brains removed. Reasoning by analogy with humans lesioned by disease or battle, Huxley finds it plausible that the frogs are not conscious, or not exercising volition; yet when thrown into water, for example, they swim just as well as undamaged frogs.

Huxley also discusses at some length the case of a Seargent F. Once or twice a month, this soldier would have a day-long bout in which he exhibited complex behavior e. Huxley allows that there can be no direct evidence showing that the soldier is conscious or not conscious; but he concludes that he may be devoid of consciousness, while performing his complex and apparently purposeful movements. Huxley was not alone among 19th century figures who gave vigorous and clear expositions of an epiphenomenalistic view. Hodgson , W. Clifford and H. Maudsley were exponents of the view. Both Romanes and James follow their statements of the view with arguments against its acceptance.

Early in his discussion of automatism, James includes some remarks about his intellectual development, and refers to his early study of medicine. Some early twentieth century dictionaries list only this meaning of the term; by mid-twentieth century, the focal philosophical meaning is standardly given. The latter restricts entry to subscribers. The following list contains all items referred to in the foregoing article, and a few other sources that offer particularly helpful discussions.

Traditional Arguments A Pro 2. Arguments in the Age of Materialism 3. Traditional Arguments A Pro Many philosophers recognize a distinction between two kinds of mental events. Antony, L. Audi, P. Bailey, A. Baltimore, J. Baumeister, R. Beebee, H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock and H. Price eds. Benecke, E. Bieri, P. Bradley, M. Carington, W. Price edited this work, and wrote an introduction and notes for it. Chalmers, D. Clifford, W. Pollock eds. Clifford , London: Macmillan, Davidson, D.

Swanson eds. Reprinted, with other relevant papers, in D. Davidson, Actions and Events , Oxford: Clarendon, De Brigard, F. Dennett, D. Descartes, R.

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